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Book Review of On Virtue Ethics, by
Rosalind Hursthouse
Margaret Urban Walker
Fordham University

On Virtue Ethics. By Rosalind Hursthouse. New York: Oxford University Press,
1999. Pp. 283. $35.00.

This very engaging book is a steadily reasoned and pointed
exploration of the logical structure and conceptual resources of neoAristotelian virtue ethics. The investigation falls into three parts:
whether and how virtue ethics can "guide action"; whether and how
virtue ethics can give an account of "moral motivation" and the role of
emotions; and whether, how, and to what extent the characteristically
rational nature of human beings as a kind can provide objective
justification for a conception of certain character traits as virtues. Each
chapter poses, explores, and answers a particular question and so has
a satisfying kind of completeness.
Chapter 1 deftly defends the claim that virtue ethics provides
action guidance, for each virtue generates a prescription and each vice
a prohibition, and there are independent reasons not to expect more in
the way of "codifiability" in ethics. Chapters 2 and 3 together offer a
nuanced exploration of how virtue ethics guides or assesses action in
hard cases or "dilemmas," resolvable or irresolvable. Tragic dilemmas,
a distinct case, are not irresolvable even if they are resolvable only in
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ways that mar nonetheless virtuous lives. Chapter 4 exposes a false
contrast between Aristotle and Kant on the moral worth of acting from
reason or inclination. The important difference between these
philosophers is instead that Aristotle's moral psychology integrates
emotions with our rational nature, as chapter 5 explains and illustrates
with the apt case of racism. Chapters 6 and 7 offer an account of
moral motivation, not as acting from a special kind of reason, but as
acting on ranges of reasons characteristic of diverse virtues insofar as
our dispositions to do so are fixed and permanent states. Yet virtue,
Hursthouse claims, can be possessed to greater or lesser degrees. The
"limited unity" of virtue means that the practical wisdom each virtue
requires "cannot occur in discrete packs," even while it is not all or
nothing.
I found the "unity" view strained and seemingly at odds with
repeated references to the fact of "patchiness" in individuals'
characters. The claim that virtues and the practical wisdom which each
involves may be possessed in different degrees is consistent with (at
least limited) unity and coheres nicely with a developmental view of
moral education. But references to agents who are "exemplary with
respect to some virtues but not all" and to those who are "pretty"
virtuous but whose exercise of virtue is "patchy" (149) are not
obviously so consistent, and when one comes to the claim that "being
particularly well endowed with respect to some virtues inevitably
involves being not very well endowed in others" (213) or that "the
exercise of at least one virtue figures much more largely and even at
the expense of the exercise of others" (216), the supposed unity
seems more than "limited." Hursthouse denies that practical wisdom
comes in discrete packages, but she does not show that it is not
context or task sensitive, even specific; similarly, that reasons for
acting characteristic of a particular virtue really "crop" up across the
ranges for other virtues (154) to the point where they are "not
independent" (155) is stipulated but begs examination, Hursthouse
concedes that people are not of a piece, but contemporary social
psychology seems to suggest that character and practical wisdom
might be more loosely configured or disparately responsive than this
aspect of her view requires.
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The final four chapters argue that a neo-Aristotelian naturalism
can provide arguably objective, though not ethically neutral, grounds
for holding certain traits to be virtues. Following Philippa Foot's lead
that a thing's kind determines the criteria of goodness of such a thing,
Hursthouse extends the "structure" of naturalistic evaluation to the
ethical evaluation of rational social animals, i.e., human beings.
Subject to some very important qualifications, we are "good human
beings" when the traits of character that dispose our actions,
emotions, and desires serve well our individual survival, the
continuance of our species, freedom from pain and enjoyment
characteristic of our kind, and the good functioning of our social group,
all in the way characteristic of the kind we are. Our characteristic
human "way" of living, however, is not one concrete way, given as it is
for the other animals, but is already normative: it is "any way we can
rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do" (221).
Justification of reasons always proceeds from within a formed ethical
outlook, significantly (but never completely) constrained by the ends
our natural being sets, and is progressively self-correcting in a
piecemeal, rather than wholesale, way (a "Neurathian procedure,"
165, 193).
Hursthouse seems to assume a kind of normative functional
unity of "the group"-a kind of natural teleology that adjusts the
flourishing of individuals and groups to each other-so that groups
function well which enable individuals to flourish (201-02). The final
chapter, however, confronts the issue of "harmony" within and among
us squarely (251). For Hursthouse, to reject the view that "human
nature is harmonious, that we can flourish or achieve eudaimonia, that
we can do it in the same way as each other, that we can do so
together, and not at each other's expense" (264) is "moral nihilism."
She sets up as her foil some remarks of Bernard Williams to the effect
that Darwinism (that other naturalism) suggests that there is no
teleology at all and that we are to some degree "a mess." I find this
dilemma false: the alternative to teleology is not necessarily "a mess";
"ethical evaluation" itself does not collapse with the rejection of natural
teleology, leaving practical reason with nothing "substantial or longterm to do" (262). The practical tasks facing our necessarily social
rationality and our deeply social emotional nature are certainly
daunting, and our capacities modest. Our individual and shared lives
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may be scenes of inescapable negotiation, costly trade-offs, and
unpredictable conflict. It does not follow that there are not better and
worse ways to live together, as we must; nor does this preclude there
being differences between reasons that can rightly be seen in common
among us as reasons and others that cannot. In an interesting finale,
Hursthouse has a belief in harmony as a kind of practical postulate and
as an expression of the virtue of hope.
This book is exemplary for its lucid organization, clarity of style,
straightforward argumentation, and consistently temperate and
constructive tone. In the introduction Hursthouse expresses the hope
that the book will be used as a text, "helping to familiarize up-andcoming students with virtue ethics' distinctive approach to a variety of
problems and issues in moral philosophy" (17). The book she has
written can serve that purpose nicely, but it is a substantial
contribution to contemporary discussion not only of virtue ethics but
also of ethical theory. It ranges over issues of moral psychology, moral
education, the limits of codifying moral judgment, the nature of
justification and objectivity, and the meaning of (one kind of)
naturalism. It repeatedly sounds the Aristotelian theme "that we were
all once children" (14) to good effect. As obvious as it sounds, this
home truth is not often mentioned or honored in moral philosophy, but
Hursthouse puts it to work at several points in her arguments
concerning moral learning, emotions, motivations, and judgment.
Hurst house writes so clearly that this book can be read with great
pleasure and deceptive ease; it is in fact densely argued, and its points
are often challenging. Anyone interested in fundamental issues of
moral philosophy will find this book a stimulating study; for
understanding virtue ethics, it is essential.
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